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BALANCING IN LOCO PARENTIS AND THE CONSTITUTION:
DEFINING THE-LIMITS OF AUTHORITY OVER
FLORIDA'S PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
Public high schools in the United States have experienced more disruption
in the last decade than ever before.1 Although it would be difficult to pinpoint
"the cause," 2 the lack of knowledge by both students and educators concerning
the limits of the school's authority over the pupil is surely a predominant
factor.3
There are three primary explanations for the confusion over the limits of
school authority. First, the United States Supreme Court has heard only one
case concerning student discipline 4 and has consistently refused to consider
other such cases. 5 Second, the numerous decisions rendered by lower federal
and state courts have been divergent and have tended only to confuse the
problem. 6 Finally, federal courts have begun to apply the abstention doctrine
to high school disruption cases7 on the premise that disciplinary problems in
secondary public schools are of a local nature and courts should not "intervene
for the purpose of rewriting secondary school rules of discipline."" Justice
Black has stated the proposition concisely: 9
1. See K. Fisn, COrFLICr AND DISSENT IN THE HIGH SCHOOLS 85-45 (1970); R. HART &
G. SAYLOR, STUNamr UNREST: THREAT OR PROMISE? (1970). For more sociologically oriented
discussions, see M. MEAD, CULTURE AND COMMITMENT: A STUDY OF THE GENERATION GAP

(1970); Knowles, Student Rights Find a Friend in Court(s), 87 NATION'S SCHoots 46-48 (1971);
Student Rights and Responsibilities,61 TODAY'S EDUCATION 50-52 (1972).
The Governor of Florida has recently recognized this problem and has initiated a statewide survey of disruptive students and their problems. The study will concentrate on students
fourteen through eighteen years of age and will be conducted for six months to a year. The
information to be collected will be used by the Governor in recommending positive steps to
remedy the problem. St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times, July 5, 1972, §D at 2,col. 1.
2. Causes that have been cited include, inter alia: racial desegregation, see S. BAILEY,
DISRUPTION IN URBAN PUBLIC SECONDARY SCHOOLS 13-33 (1971); court decisions such as Tinker

v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1960), and Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which have created an awareness among students that
they have rights school officials cannot suppress; and the influence of college student activism.
T. SELmsoN, THE HIGH SCHOOL REVOLUTIONARIES 229-58 (1970).
See M. LmARu, &-

3. It should be kept in mind that in Florida's public high schools there are 738,000 students, 82,000 teachers, and 960 administrators, FLORIDA COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION, PUPIL,
PERSONNEL, AND FINANCIAL DATA 1971-1972, 7-12.
4. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 893 U.S. 503 (1969).
5. E.g., Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972);
Olff v. East Side Union High School Dist., 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1042 (1972); Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970);
Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970).
6. See note 79 infra and accompanying text.
7. E.g., Egner v. Texas City Independent School Dist., 338 F. Supp. 931 (S.D. Tex. 1972);
Press v. Pasadena Independent School Dist., 326 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Tex. 1971). For an analysis of the abstention trend see 4 ST. MARY'S L.J. 232 (1972).

8. Press v. Pasadena Independent School Dist., 326 F. Supp. 550, 553 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
9. Karr v. Schmidt, 401 U.S. 1201, 1203 (1971). Although this case specifically deals with
the regulation of student hair length, Justice Black's opinion clearly exemplifies the basic
abstention doctrine.
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[I]t would be difficult to prove by reason, logic, or common sense that
the federal judiciary is more competent to deal with .. .[disciplinary
problems] than are the local school authorities and state legislatures of
all our 50 States. Perhaps if the courts will leave the States free to perform their own constitutional duties they will at least be able successfully to regulate ...[their schools].
In addition to helping define the problems, Justice Black has suggested
that state legislatures enact statutory guidelines to clearly define the school's
authority over a pupil. 1° The purpose of this note is to propose such guidelines for Florida.11 Statutory proposals are presented in conjunction with the
five primary problem areas in public high schools: 12 (1) student demonstrations,' s (2) secret societies,' 4 (3) student appearances, 5 (4) student underground newspapers,1 and (5) searches of students and their lockers to uncover
17
contraband.
THE BACKGROUND: In Loco Parentis
Florida schools presently derive their regulatory powers over students from
a general enabling act granting county school boards the power to "adopt
rules and regulations for the control, discipline, and suspension of pupils."' 8
The limitation on rules and regulations so adopted is found in the common
law doctrine of in loco parentis,'9 under which the school stands in the place
of the parent and has almost plenary power over the pupil while he is in
school. 20 Conversely, the school has no power over the pupil once he returns

10. Several states have already taken steps to codify school rules into law and thereby
provide both educators and students with clear definitions of the school's authority. See Ind.
S. Enrolled Act No. 8 (1973) (to amend IND. CODE tit. 20 (1971); Ore. S. Bill 11 (1973) (the
purpose of which was to establish minimum standards of student personal appearance);
Runkel & Bettis, Public Schools and Personal Appearance: Some Theories, 7 WILLAMETTE
L.J. 419, 434 n.69 (1971).
11. Legislative guidelines may possibly result from the Governor's survey on disruption.
See note I supra.
12. See E. BOLMEIR, LEGAL LIMITs OF AUTHORITY OVER THE PUPIL, 73-117 (1970).
13. See text accompanying note 36 infra.
14. See text accompanying note 61 infra.
15. See text accompanying note 77 infra.
16. See text accompanying note 103 infra.
17. See text accompanying note 116 infra.
18. FLA. STAT. §230.23(6)(c) (1971). See also FLA. STAT. §232.25 (1971), which allows
county school boards to exert authority over pupils in route to or from school; FLA. STAT.
§232.26 (1971), which defines the principal's general authority; FLA. STAT. §232.27 (1971),
which defines the teacher's general authority.
19. The expression means: "In the place of a parent; instead of a parent; charged,
factitiously, with a parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities." BLAcK's LAw DICrIONARY 896
(rev. 4th ed. 1968).
20. See Richardson v. Braham, 125 Neb. 142, 249 N.W. 557 (1933); McLean Independent
School Dist. v. Andrews, 333 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); Flory v. Smith, 145 Va. 164,
134 S.E. 360 (1926).
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to the home, the domain of the real parent.21 The classic statement of the
22
doctrine comes from Blackstone:
A parent may also delegate part of his parental authority, during
his life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco
parentis,and has such a portion of the power of the parent committed
as may be necessary
to his charge, viz. that of restraint and correction,
23
to answer the purposes for which he is employed.
Although early cases carried the doctrine to an extreme, 24 in loco parentis
has always been qualified in its application. While the student is at school
the school's authority over him extends only "as may be reasonably necessary
to enable the teachers to perform their duties and to effect the general purposes of education." 25 An illustrative decision, Guerrieri v. Tyson,26 held a
teacher liable for administering medical aid to a student on the ground that
the teacher's action was not necessary to effectuate the school's purposes and,
therefore, was not within the scope of the in loco parentis doctrine.
The converse of the doctrine - that the school's authority terminates when
2
the student reaches home-was established in 1877. In Dritt v. Snodgrass 7
the court reinstated a student who had been expelled for violating a school
board rule that prohibited students from attending social parties during the
school year.
While the invasion of the parental domain is outside the in loco parentis

21. See Hobbs v. Germany, 94 Miss. 469, 49 So. 515 (1909); Dritt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo.
286 (1877); State ex rel. Clark v. Osborne, 24 Mo. App. 309 (1887).
22. 1 IV. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453.

23. This permissive terminology of early commentators was formulated during a time
when education was left exclusively to private schools. Today's compulsory education has
resulted in mandatory definitions as in the following excerpt from Richardson v. Braham,
125 Neb. 142, 145-46, 249 N.W. 557, 559 (1933): "During school hours .. .general education
and the control of pupils who attend public schools are in the hands of school boards,
superintendents, principals and teachers. This control extends to health, proper surroundings, necessary discipline, promotion of morality and other wholesome influences, while
parentalauthority is temporarily superseded." (Emphasis added).
The Supreme Court of Florida has held similarly in John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88
Fla. 510, 516, 102 So. 637, 640 (1924): "As to mental training, moral and physical discipline,
and welfare of the pupils, college authorities stand in loco parentis and in their discretion
may make any regulation for their government which a parent could make for the same
purpose."
24. E.g., Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538 (1923). In Pugsley a seventeenyear-old girl was expelled for wearing face powder at school. The court upheld the school
board, which asserted that a school rule, no matter how unnecessary or irrelevant, must
remain unchallenged due to its promulgation by school authorities.
25. Halley v. Brooks, 191 S.W. 781, 783 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916). See Blackstone's definition
in text accompanying note 22 supra.

26. 147 Pa. Super. 239, 24 A.2d 468 (1942). The teacher had immersed a ten-year-old
pupil's hand with an infected finger in scalding water against his will and held it there for
about ten minutes causing intense pain and permanent disfigurement of the hand.

27. 66 Mo. 286 (1877).
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doctrine in cases such as Snodgrass,28 certain invasions may be upheld under
an exception to this converse of the doctrine. The exception arises when a
student has reached home and then commits an act having a "direct and immediate tendency to injure the school." 29 For example, a teacher who punishes
a student for publicly ridiculing him after school hours will be held to have
acted properly.30 The rationale is that the student's actions will result in increased disruption and insubordination in the school.
While this outline of in loco parentis presents the two sides of the doctrine
and the qualifications on each, modern decisions involving school authority
must be viewed in light of the cultural changes in the United States, which
31
have produced different attitudes regarding the student's legal character.
Totalitarian authority granted to the schools in earlier cases has given way
to a new concept of student rights, 3 2 and students have been recognized by
the Supreme Court as "persons under our constitution."' 33 The natural consequence of this new approach is a clash between students' asserted constitutional rights and the in loco parentis doctrine. As a result of the conflict a
balancing test has developed in which constitutional rights are "applied in
34
light of the special characteristics of the school environment."
Statutory proposals purporting to define the school's authority over the
pupil must take this required balance into consideration 3 by including provisions that protect the students' constitutional rights while still reserving in
school officials the authority to maintain a proper educational atmosphere.
The following statutory proposals are directed at that goal.

28. Id. at 298.
29. Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 120 (1859).
30. Id. A student, while in the company of some other pupils, was driving his parents'
cows past his teacher's house an hour and a half after school had ended and was heard by
the teacher referring to him as "Old Jack Seaver." The following day "Old Jack" administered corporal punishment. An action brought against the teacher for assault and battery
was unsuccessful. The court noted that school authorities lack power to act in out-of-school
activities except when such activity "has a direct and immediate tendency to injure the
school, to subvert the master's authority, and to beget discord and insubordination."
31. See K. FISH, CONFLICT AND DISSENT IN THE HIGH SCHOoLs 35-45 (1970); M. LBARDE &
T. SELIGSON, THE HIGH SCHOOL REVOLUTIONARIES 229-58 (1970).
32. For a discussion in the evolution of the attitude of the courts, see Ladd, Allegedly
Disruptive Student Behavior and the Legal Authority of School Officials, 19 J. PuB. L. 209,
222-29 (1970).
33. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969);
cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
34. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
The balancing test approach may leave students' rights in relatively the same state of confusion as before. Interpretations as to what the law is naturally differ and cause conflict. Due
to the lack of a clear definition of student rights, the New York Civil Liberties Union distributed 100,000 copies of a student rights handbook. The pamphlet listed broad principles
of law that could easily add to the confusion rather than clarify the problem. New York
school officials seem to believe that the pamphlets are causing problems instead of solving
them and several New York high school districts have banned distribution of the handbooks.
Knowles, supra note 1,at 46, 47.
35. For a proposal, directed to school boards, of a balanced approach to school rule
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Student demonstrations in public high schools, the only students' rights
issue specifically dealt with by the Supreme Court,36 must be viewed in two
categories: passive demonstrations37 and active demonstrations. 8 In Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District 39 the Supreme Court

left no doubt concerning the state of the law relating to passive demonstrations vis-h-vis the in loco parentis doctrine.40
In Tinker two public high school students were suspended for wearing
black armbands in protest of the war in Viet Nam. The United States Supreme Court held the passive expression was "closely akin to pure speech,"'and absent any demonstration by school officials that their interest in maintaining order was threatened by a "material and substantial interference with
school work or discipline," 42 they could not prohibit such symbolic speech.
While this balancing test requires case-by-case determination, the decision
clearly interprets "material and substantial interference." Tinker places the
burden upon the school to prove that its anticipation of disruption was reasonably founded, that the disturbance would be more than minimal, and that it
would come from those seeking to exercise their rights rather than from those
reacting to the passive demonstration. 43 The Court further ruled it is not
enough for school officials to argue that the intentional disobedience of any
rule promotes disorder or that a court's role in invalidating the rule will
interfere with school discipline."
Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education45 exemplifies the "material and substantial interference" that must exist in order for school officials to quash symbolic speech. In Blackwell students in an all-black public
high school wore freedom buttons46 to school and distributed them in the cor-

formulation, see NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION PUBLICATIONS, CODE OF STUDENT RIGHTs
AND RESPONSIBILITIES (1971).

36. See Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
37. Passive demonstration is herein used to refer to symbolic types of speech such as the
wearing of armbands and political buttons.
38. Active demonstration is herein used to refer to speech in the form of words or
conduct and generally connotes situations in which students aggressively attempt to attract
attention and influence other students.
39. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
40. For a discussion focusing on Tinker, see Note, Emerging Rights of High School

Students: The Law Comes of Age, 23 U. FIA. L. REv. 549 (1971).
41. 393 U.S. at 505.
42. Id. at 511. See Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
43. 393 U.S. at 508-09. The Court emphasized it would be insufficient for school officials
to argue that the ideas proposed were unsuitable for other students to hear or that the
school administration wishes to avoid the unpleasantness likely to accompany an unpopular
viewpoint.
44. Id. See also Griffin v. Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60, 64 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
45. 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
46. The buttons had a black and a white hand joined with "SNCC" inscribed in the
margin. Id. at 750.
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ridors to other students including those who did not want them.47 Due to the
attendant disruption, the principal forbade students to wear the buttons at
school. When students who persisted in wearing the buttons were sent home,
they caused further disruption by entering classrooms to encourage others to
leave school and by throwing buttons into classrooms through open windows.
Emphasizing the collision with the rights of others caused by the button
proponents, the court concluded the reprehensible conduct was so inexorably
tied to the wearing of the buttons that the two were inseparable. Therefore,
the rule prohibiting the buttons was held to be reasonable and not an unconstitutional infringement on the students' right of free speech. 48
The balancing test of the passive demonstration case law gives way to a
practical presumption in favor of school authorities in active demonstration
situations. Mistaken assumptions by students that the Tinker decision extended to them a right to speak out on any issue in any manner have proved
unfortunate for such students. 45 The balance has weighed in favor of the in
loco parentis doctrine in every case involving an active demonstration.5 0
Since Tinker, the rationale for these decisions has been clear. Active demonstrations during school hours can be regarded, almost per se, as material
and substantial interference with the requirements of appropriate discipline
for school operation. Thus, it has been held that the first amendment does not
protect students when they participate in violent racial conflicts, 51 refuse to
go to class, 5 2 sit-in during class time, 53 demonstrate by moving through the
hallways disturbing students in class, s5 and take part in walkouts. 55
Additionally, in loco parentis notions have been extended to allow school
officials to regulate active demonstrations where the "interference with appropriate discipline" involved considerations other than class disruption. Byrd
v. Gary 6 upheld suspensions of students who attempted to organize a boycott
by the student body of products served by the school cafeteria.57 Lipkis v.
47. See also Aguirre v. Tahoka Independent School Dist., 311 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Tex.
1970), in which Mexican-American student demonstrators wore brown armbands and attempted to put one on an unwilling student. The result is exemplary of the case-by-case approach taken in this area, since the result is in conflict with that in Blackwell.
48. 363 F.2d at 754.
49. Aside from a very general awareness of court decisions such as Tinker, students surely
must be misled by publications that express the author's views of the way the law should be
as being the way it is. See note 34 supra; K. FISH, CONFLICT AND DISSENT IN THE HIGH SCHOOIS
89-112 (1970).
50. See, e.g., Dunn v. Tyler Independent School Dist., 460 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972);
Gebert v. Hoffman, 336 F. Supp. 694 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Tillman v. Dade County School Bd.,
327 F. Supp. 930 (S.D. Fla. 1971): Texarkana Independent School Dist. v. Lewis, 470 S.W.2d
727 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
51. E.g., Tillman v. Dade County School Bd., 327 F. Supp. 930 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Texarkana
Independent School Dist. v. Lewis, 470 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
52. Id.
53. Gebert v. Hoffman, 336 F. Supp. 694 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
54. Id.
55. Dunn v. Tyler Independent School Dist., 460 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
56. 184 F. Supp. 388 (E.D.S.C. 1960).
57. Considerations involved in this case would have to include the financial burden put
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Caveney58 denied a student's request for a writ of mandamus to compel school
officials to permit rallies during lunch periods. While financial ramifications
were inherent in the student action in Byrd, the Caveney court emphasized
the rights of other students. Forcing the school to permit individual students

to initiate rallies would, the court held, infringe upon the rights of others who
would be a "captive audience for speechmaking." 59 The court concurred with
Justice Black's observation that such regulations protect the educational process and those partaking of it in our public schools from the whims and
G
caprices of "the loudest-mouthed, but maybe not the brightest, students."

Therefore, Tinker's specific ruling as to passive demonstrations and its
implication as to active demonstrations require nothing more for the statutory
proposal in this area than codification of the Supreme Court's mandate:

(1) County school boards of the State of Florida shall have the
power to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations regarding- student
conduct and discipline while on the school premises. Such rules and
regulations shall not be applied to prohibit the exercise of free speech,
whether symbolic or by words or conduct, unless that exercise of free
speech results in material and substantial interference with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school or
unless that exercise would reasonably lead school authorities to forecast
such material and substantial interference.
SECRET SOCIETIES
6
The regulation of secret societies ' indicates the breadth of the in

loco

parentis doctrine in earlier times. During the early twentieth century, high
school students began forming fraternities and sororities to emulate similar

college organizations. School officials, claiming that secret societies had an ill
effect on school discipline, persuaded state legislatures to pass statutes empower62
ing school authorities to ban the organizations. Florida adopted three such
3
statutes, which prohibit secret societies in public high schools,6 prohibit

upon the cafeteria, which if like the ordinary school cafeteria would have been operating
with a close budget. Losses to a school cafeteria surely would result in higher prices charged
in the future to all students.
58. 19 Cal. App. 3d 383, 96 Cal. Rptr. 779 (Dist. Ct. 1971).
59. Id. at 387, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
60. Id. See Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 525 (1969).
61. "Secret societies" refers to high school fraternities, sororities, and other organizations
that are not sponsored by the school or recognized as an organization existing within the
school.
62. E.g., ARK. SrAT. §§80-2001 to -2007 (1947); COLO. REv. STAT. §§123-21-18 to -19 (1963);
LA. REv. STAT. §§17:2091-93 (1963); MINN. STAT. ANN. §127.17 (1959); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16,
§1164 (1947).
Florida's Education Commissioner feels there has been a resurgance of secret societies in
Florida high schools and that these groups are fostering racism and hampering school desegregation. While admitting that the secret societies "probably aren't even a problem in
some counties," the Commissioner favors a meat-ax approach that would "dissolve these
groups completely, and break them up." Gainesville (Fla.) Sun., June 11, 1973, §B at 1, col. 5.
63. FLA. STAT. §232.39 (Supp. 1972).
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pupils in public schools from belonging to the societies, 64 and require local
school boards to enforce the first two statutes by suspending or expelling offenders. 65
The reason often given by the courts for enforcing the various state statutes
has been that "fraternities and sororities are inimical to the best interest of
the public and the schools because they tend to engender an undemocratic
66
spirit of caste, promote cliques, and foster a contempt for school authority."
Aside from being inconsonant with modern views of the in loco parentis
doctrine, this rationale and the statutes conflict with the balancing concept of
Tinker, which requires material and substantial interference before students'
rights can be quashed.
The requirement that school boards automatically enforce the Florida
statutes by suspension or expulsion V is an apparent denial of due process.
Attending public schools is a right of all school age children6s that cannot be
withdrawn without a hearing to determine whether the student's actions have
interfered with the operation of the school. 69
In addition, the Florida statutes appear unreasonably discriminatory.
Florida statute, section 232.39, which prohibits secret societies in the public
schools, extends exceptions to three groups of organizations: those fostered
and promoted by the school authorities;7 0 those approved by the school
authorities whose memberships are selected on the basis of good character,
scholarship, leadership ability, and achievement; 71 and those sponsored by a
72
listed group of organizations such as Kiwanis, Rotary, and Civitan clubs.
Discrimination is apparent on the face of the statute. Whereas clubs sponsored by the civic groups have no required standards, secret societies must be
approved by school authorities and must meet specific membership admission
standards. The Florida supreme court, however, has refused to find discrimination in the statute reasoning that:' 3

64. FLA.
65. FLA.

STAT.
STAT.

§232A0 (1971).
§232.41 (1971).

66. Bradford v. Board of Educ., 18 Cal. App. 19, 23, 121 P. 929, 931 (Ct. App. 1912).

67. See FLA.

STAT.

§232.41 (1971).

68. See generally Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
69. See Wright v. Board of Educ., 295 Mo. 466, 482, 246 S.W. 43, 47 (1922), in which
the court states: "Those who are members of the prohibited fraternities, unless same are
shown to possess the detrimental features stated, are as much entitled to all of the advantages afforded by the school as other pupils."

70.

FLA. STAT. §232.39(3)

(Supp. 1972).

71. Id.
72. FLA. STAT. §232.39(4) (Supp. 1972). The civic organizations listed are: Knights of
Pythias, Oddfellows, Moose, Woodmen of the World, Knights of Columbus, Elks, Masons,
B'nai B'rith, Young Men's and Young Women's Christian Association, Young Men's and
Young Women's Hebrew Associations, Kiwanis, Rotary, Optimist, Civitan, Exhange Clubs,
Florida Federation of Garden Clubs, and Florida Federation of Women's Clubs.
73. Satan Fraternity v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 156 Fla. 222, 226, 22 So. 2d 892, 893-94
(1945).
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It is at least far fetched to contend that high school fraternities and
sororities are on a parity with religious organizations and fraternal sodeties such as the Masons, Elks, Odd Fellows, and others. The church
and the Masons are much older than the State, and fostered education
long before the State did and have never been charged with acts
inimical to it.
The error in this reasoning is that the court has incorrectly concerned
itself with the sponsoring organizations rather than the high school groups
they sponsor. The legislative intent was to prohibit secret societies in the
public schools because they "tend to engender an undemocratic spirit of
74
caste, to promote cliques, and to foster contempt for school authority."
However, the legislature and the court failed to realize that a club sponsored
by the Masons, Kiwanis Club, or even the school itself can create as much
hatred, jealousy, rivalry, and school disruption as a secret society with no
sponsor. This is even more probable where the statutorily preferred clubs
have no membership standards.
Finally, Florida's statutes seem to conflict with the in loco parentis doctrine,76 since secret societies meet off school grounds after school hours and do
not conflict directly with any school activity. The statutes over-extend in loco
and
parentis by allowing school authorities to supersede parental authority
76
day.
a
hours
twenty-four
association
of
freedom
control the student's
Since school authorities have the power to regulate student organizations
during the school day, members of secret societies who disrupt school functions
should be punished. Their punishment, however, should be as individuals and
because of individual conduct, not because of affiliation with a secret society.
Although the present Florida statutes clearly define school officials' authority
in secret society regulation and are the type of legislation this note advocates,
modern attitudes toward in loco parentis require they be amended. The proposed statutory guidelines would replace Florida statutes, sections 232.39-.41
with legislation providing:
(2) County school boards of the State of Florida shall not prescribe rules
prohibiting students from exercising freedom of association after school
74. Bradford v. Board of Educ., 18 Cal. App. 19, 23, 121 P. 929, 931 (Ct. App. 1912).
75. The converse side of the doctrine is that once a child returns home he is in the
domain of the parent and the school has no authority. See text accompanying note 21 supra.

76. Three dissenting justices in Steel v. Sexton, 253 Mich. 32, 234 N.V. 436 (1931), put
it this way: "The state has broad powers, but parents still have some control over their
children, who are not yet wards of the state, as in Sparta or Soviet Russia. The state may
well prescribe that pupils shall attend public or private schools, shall not be raised in
ignorance, shall have opportunities for education, but neither the Legislature nor the school
authorities have a right to dictate or interfere with the activities of the pupil when not in
school. He is then under parental care.... Public education has its legitimate sphere, but
the child, except when in school or on his way to or from there, is not under control of
school authorities. The board of education ought not to be constituted social snoopers; they,
cannot be authorized by law to control the activities of pupils out of school which activities
in no way interfere with the educational activities of the pupil in school." Id. at 46, 234
N.V. at 440.
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hours. Fraternities, sororities, and other organizations whose memberships
are comprised wholly or partially from students of public schools shall not
be prohibited from existing away from school, and any activity that takes
place upon the school premises before, during, or after school hours in the
name of such organizations and is disruptive of the educational purposes
of the school shall be regulated only by punishment of the participating
offenders. No student may be punished for acts committed by such organizations merely due to his membership or affiliation with the organization.
STUDENT APPEARANCE

Few areas of the law are of more concern to high school students than the
regulation of student appearance through the use of school dress 77 and groom-

ing codes.7 8 Unfortunately, the courts are greatly divided as to whether a high
school student should be allowed to determine his personal appearance with79
out the intervention of school authorities.
The regulation of students' hair length has been dealt with under various
constitutional gTounds.80 School grooming codes"' have been considered under

77. The vast majorty of cases and articles deal with grooming regulations, and they will
be the primary focus of this section. For cases dealing specifically with dress codes see, e.g.,
Press v. Pasadena Independent School Dist., 326 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Scott v. Board
of Educ., 61 Misc. 2d 333, 305 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
78. Many comments have been written concerning this area. See, e.g., 38 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 802 (1972); 84 HARV. L. REv. 1702 (1971); 4 ST. MARY's L.J. 232 (1972).
79. In a slight majority of cases the courts have upheld school regulations pertaining to
grooming regulations. E.g., Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970); Davis v. Firment,
408 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1969); Valdes v. Monroe County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 325 F. Supp.
572 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Southern v. Board of Trustees for Dallas Independent School Dist., 318
F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Carter v. Hodges, 317 F. Supp. 89 (W.D. Ark. 1970); Whitsell
v. Pampa Independent School Dist., 316 F. Supp. 852 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Livingston v. Swanquist, 314 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Giangreco v. Center School Dist., 313 F. Supp. 776
(W.D. Mo. 1969); Gfell v. Rickelman, 313 F. Supp. 364 (N.D. Ohio 1970); Corley v. Daunhauer, 312 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
For decisions favoring the rights of students, see, e.g., Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th
Cir. 1970), reversing 303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969); Dawson v. HilIsborough County
School Bd., 322 F. Supp. 286 (M.D. Fla.), afl'd, 445 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1971); Black v. Cothren,
316 F. Supp. 468 (D. Neb. 1970); Cordova v. Chonko, 315 F. Supp. 953 (N.D. Ohio 1970);
Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Vt. 1970); Lovelace v. Leechburg Area School Dist.,
310 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1970); Cash v. Hoch, 309 F. Supp. 346 (W.D. Wis. 1970); Crossen
v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114 (D. Conn. 1970); Sims v. Colfax Community School Dist., 307
F. Supp. 485 (S.D. Iowa 1970); Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969);
Griffin v. Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60 (M.D. Ala. 1969); Conyers v. Glenn, 243 So. 2d 204 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
80. See Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1972); 4 ST. MARY'S L.J. 232 (1972).
81. As an example, Pinellas County School Board's Policies and Procedures at 49 states:
"That boys be clean-shaven and wear their hair styles in conventional manner; that it clears
the eyebrows, the ears and is tapered to the collar. Sideburns should be straight and no
longer than the bottom of the ear." Conyers v. Glenn, 243 So. 2d 204, 206 n.l

(2d D.CA.

Fla. 1971).
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substantive due process, 4 and

freedom of expression.s Many courts, however, treat the issue simply as one
of whether any student right in fact exists, not whether such right can be fitted
neatly into a precise constitutional clause.88 Despite their simple approach,
such courts exemplify the confusion existent in this area of student regulation.
The decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ferrel v. Dallas Independent School District7 is the most frequently cited case upholding hair
regulations. In Ferrel the court assumed arguendo88 that there was a fundamental right to wear one's hair in any desired manner. However, the court
found that the "interest of the state in maintaining an effective and efficient
school system"8 9 was a compelling reason that justified abridgement of the
assumed right.
Federal district courts in Florida were quick to point out that Ferrel had
not settled the issue. The Southern District held that students had no right
under the constitution to wear long hair and, as a matter of law, the court had
no jurisdiction over such cases.90 Within the same year the Middle District
court ruled that there was such a right. 91 The Middle District's rationale was
that Ferrel would not have required a compelling state interest unless there
was encroachment upon a constitutional right.92
In the wake of this confusion, the Fifth Circuit decided to settle the issue
for the federal courts. In Karrv. Schmidt93 the court explicitly held there is no
constitutional right "to wear one's hair in a public high school in the length
and style that suits the wearer." 94 Further, the court announced a per se rule

82. E.g., Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Vt. 1970). Students in this type of
case advocate that denial of education on the basis of hair length is an arbitrary classification
violative of the equal protection clause.
83. E.g., Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971). Students here rely on Griswold

v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and assert a constitutionally protected zone of personal
privacy upon which the state may infringe only for compelling reasons.
84. E.g., Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (Ist Cir. 1971); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d
1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970).
85. E.g., Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1084, 1038-39 (7th Cir. 1969); Brick v. Board of Educ.,
305 F. Supp. 1316, 1320 (D. Colo. 1969).
86. E.g., Dawson v. Hillsborough County School Bd., 322 F. Supp. 286, 804 (M.D. Fla.),
aff'd, 445 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1971) where the court stated: "Whether this right to regulate
one's hair length is characterized as protected by the First Amendment (freedom of expression), the Ninth Amendment (penumbral rights), or the Fourteenth Amendment (right to
reasonable and nonarbitrary classification) is of no import ......
87. 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968).
88. Id. at 702.
89. Id. at 703.
90. Valdes v. Monroe County Bd.of Pub. Instruction, 325 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
91. Dawson v. Hillsborough County School Bd., 322 F. Supp. 286 (M.D. Fla.), afJ'd, 445
F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1971).
92. Id. at 304. Apparently the court purposely deemphasized that Ferrel was based on a
mere arguendo assumption that a constitutional right was at stake.
93. 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1972).
94. Id. at 613. The Supreme Court in Tinker did not deal with the question of hair
length: "The problem posed by the present case does not relate to regulation of the length
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that school grooming regulations are constitutionally valid. 95 Where a complaint merely alleges the constitutional invalidity of a grooming regulation,
the federal district courts now must grant an immediate motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. 96
While the federal district courts of Florida are clearly bound under Karr,9
Florida's state courts are not. In the only Florida court decision specifically
dealing with student hair length, 98 Conyers v. Glenn,99 the court applied a
balancing test that should be continued in Florida. While Conyers held that
one's hair style is a constitutional right of the individual, the decision also
recognized the possibility that exaggerated hair styles and other expressions of
individuality could cause disruption. Further, relying upon the Tinker
rationale,00 the court held the test to be that the right to an education cannot
be denied to a student "in the absence of a showing that his conduct as an
individual infringes on the rights of other students to an education."11
Whether a student's appearance is disruptive or infringes upon the rights
of others is a question of fact. It would be very difficult to draft statutory
guidelines that would cover every conceivable situation.102 The proper apof skirts or the type of clothing, to hair style, or deportment ....
It does not concern aggressive, disruptive action or even group demonstrations. Our problem involves direct primary
First Amendment rights akin to 'pure speech.'" Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507-08 (1969).
95. Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 617 (5th Cir. 1972).
96. Id. at 618.
97. Dawson v. Hillsborough County School Bd., 322 F. Supp. 286, 303 (M.D. Fla.), af'd,
445 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1971). The opinion in Karr was specifically directed to federal district
courts in the fifth circuit. Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 618 (5th Cir. 1972).
98. Canney v. Alachua County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 231 So. 2d 34 (Ist D.C.A. Fla.
1970), originated as a hair length case and is often referred to as such. However, the issue
of the school's grooming regulation was eliminated from the court's decision in the case because the issue was not properly before the court.
99. 243 So. 2d 204 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1971).
100. Id. at 205.
101. Id. at 207. Apparently, the court relied upon the disruption test of Tinker, equating
disruption with the infringement upon the rights of others.
102. The factual question naturally requires a common sense analysis. There are times
when the appearance of a student can obviously be deemed distracting to other students. An
interesting example is proposed in 85 HARV. L. REy. 1702, 1715 (1971): "Very short miniskirts and transparent blouses, however appealing, do distract. A boy who came to school
dressed as Superman one day, Robin Hood the next, the Lone Ranger the next, and so on,
would certainly take some students' minds off their work. Eventually, students might well
become accustomed to any particular costume, but the distractions attendant upon the
initial appearance of each costume might, in the aggregate, be deemed intolerable. On the
other hand, students will always spend some time admiring each other. Boys will look at
girls, and girls at boys, even when they are normally clothed and coiffed. But if a certain
amount of distraction is tolerated, it does not follow that school boards are powerless to
eliminate more serious sources of distraction."
In Scott v. Board of Educ., 61 Misc. 2d 333, 338, 305 N.Y.S.2d 601, 606 (Sup. Ct. 1969),
dress codes were also the issue, and the court pointed out that dress regulations could be
justified and upheld when they prohibited such things as "slacks that are so skintight and,
therefore, revealing as to provoke or distract students of the opposite sex and slacks to the
bottom of which small bells have been attached."
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proach therefore would seem to be an adoption of the Conyers test with the
requirement that school officials in each factual situation satisfy the court that
the test has been met. Such a guideline would not only apprise school officials
of their legal confines, but also would give students a specific and simple test
with which to challenge school officials' actions. The statutory guidline should
be:
(8) County school boards of the State of Florida shall enforce no rule
regulating students' personal appearances or suspend, expel, exclude, or
punish in any way a student on the basis of his personal appearance unless
such appearance results in a material and substantial disruption that infringes upon the rights of other students in the school to an education, or
unless such appearance can be reasonably forecast to result in such disruption.
STUDENT UNDERGROUND NEWSPAPERS

The regulation of high school underground newspapers 0 3 is one of the
more intense areas of confrontation between in loco parentis and students'
rights. The conflict arises when school officials assert prior restraints over
student papers with requirements that all material distributed to other students be approved by school authorities.104
While students have asserted that they have the same rights against prior
restraint as adults, the immaturity of the publishers and their audiences has
caused the courts to rule to the contrary. 05 Courts generally have upheld the
imposition of regulations on student newspapers, and one recent case 00 has
liberally extended the Tinker forecast rule'0 7 to cover this type of prior restraint. In Scoville v. Joliet Township High School District 204105 the forecast
rule was interpreted to mean that school officials need only show that a student publication would in the future cause material and substantial interference with school functions. 0 9 Such holdings show that the courts do recognize the practicality of allowing school officials to regulate student publications.
The same disruption ideas can easily be applied to conceivable hair style situations. Students with "Mohawk" hair cuts, shaved heads or those who would dye their hair green or
purple would probably disrupt their fellow students. However, since long hair alone is very
much in vogue today it could hardly be deemed disruptive to high school students in Florida.

103. This section concerns newspapers, pamphlets, and other materials written and published by students at their own expense, off the school grounds, and not officially sanctioned
by school authorities.
104. Baker v. Board of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517, 526 (C.D. Cal. 1969), shows that the
distribution on or off school grounds is not an issue in these cases: "The school authorities
are responsible for the morals of the students while going to and from schools, as well as
during the time they are on campus." See also K. AEXANDER, R. CORNS, & W. MCCAM, PUBLIC
SCHOOL LAW: CASES AND MATEr iA.S 607 (1969).
105. See, e.g., Baker v. Board of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517, 527 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
106. Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 400 US. 826 (1970).
107. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
108. 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970).
109. Id. at 13.
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In addition, the courts have been uniform in refusing to find a right of free
expression in other instances. When libel or obscenity is involved, for example, no first amendment protection exists, 11 and regulations prohibiting
"vulgar" and "profane" language have thus been upheld., Similarly, students
can be prohibited from selling newspapers on campus," 2 even though they
contain politically significant material, since the commercial aspect involved
prevents the students from using the first amendment as a shield."13
The problem remaining after granting school officials prior restraint
powers is the possibility of abuse of those powers. In addition to abusive
censorship, the students must be protected from the problems inherent in
editorial review. Occasions calling for the exercise of the freedom of expression
are often fleeting, and a lack of clarity or a delay in the implementation of
screening regulations carry the danger that the exercise of the freedom might
be chilled during the period of its importance."'1
The proper safeguard could be secured by authorizing school officials to
initiate prior restraint only where there are written regulations stating:' 1 '
(1) the procedure by which materials are to be submitted for approval; (2) a
brief and reasonable period during which the school officials can review the
material; (3) a reasonable method of appealing the school official's decision;
and (4) a brief and reasonable period during which the appeal must be decided. Such safeguards would balance in loco parentis and students' rights
properly, allowing the school to maintain discipline and the student to express his political views. The statutory guideline proposed is:
(4) County school boards of the State of Florida shall have the authority
to enact reasonable regulations requiring the prior approval by designated
school authorities of any pamphlets, newspapers, or other publications that
are sold or distributed before, during, or after school for the purpose of
restraining material that is libelous, obscene, or which is or can reasonably
be forecast to result in material and substantial disruption to proper school
discipline. However, to ensure student freedom of expression concerning
politically significant issues, such regulations shall be available for student
examination and shall state clearly: The procedure for the submission of
proposed material to the designated school authorities for prior approval;
a brief and reasonable period of time during which the approval must be
granted or denied; a reasonable appellate mechanism and its procedure;
and a brief and reasonable time during which the appeal must be decided.

110. See, e.g., Shanley v. Northeast Independent School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972).
111. E.g., Baker v. Board of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969). In Baker the
suspended students had published a newspaper named Oink, which contained "profanity"
in its advertisements and in an article entitled "Student as Nigger." Id. at 519, 530.
112. Some states have statutes prohibiting any commercial enterprises in their public
schools. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §126.19 (Supp. 1973): "No person shall offer for sale, sell,
or peddle any . . . newspapers . . . or any other thing whatsoever . . . in any public school
building or upon public school grounds."
113. See genrally Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
114. Shanley v. Northeast Independent School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 977 (5th Cir. 1972).
115. Id. at 978.
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SEARCHES OF STUDENTS AND THEIR LociKEs

Drug problems among high school students have generated warrantless
searches of students and their lockers by school officials. 116 While there has
been a liberal trend toward the protection of students' first amendment rights,
the courts have almost totally denied students fourth amendment protections.
Recent decisions have allowed school officials to search students117 and their
lockers" 8 without warrants and have allowed police acting with the consent
of school officials to search student lockers.11 9
These decisions too greatly devaluate students' fourth amendment rights to
be used as a foundation for proposed statutory guidelines. Instead, a balance
should be sought that would ensure both the proper exercise of the school
official's duty to protect the health and safety of the students entrusted to his
care and the proper protection of the students' fourth amendment rights. By
differentiating between searches of the student's person and searches of the
student's locker this balance can be obtained.
The obvious necessity120 in reserving in school officials the power to conduct locker searches has been upheld on the ground that school officials are
not government officials under the fourth amendment.' 2' Varying circumstances often make this determination questionable. 2 2 A much more satisfying
result could be reached based upon the legal ownership of school lockers. Two
recent cases, People v. Overton 23 and State v. Stein 24 demonstrate the effec116. Other situations such as bomb threats and possession of lethal weapons in which
the health or safety of the school population is endangered have also contributed to these
search and seizure cases. See, e.g., In re Boykin, 39 Ill. 2d 617, 237 N.E.2d 460 (1968); State
v. Stein, 203 Kan. 638, 456 P.2d 1 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 947 (1970). Nevertheless, the
vast majority of such cases are drug predicated. For discussions of the drug problem see
Barrins, Drug Abuse: New Problem for Boards, Am. SCHOOL BOARD J., Oct. 1969, at 14;
Marijuanain the Houston High Schools- A First Report, 6 HOUSTON L. REv. 759 (1969).
117. E.g., In re Fred C., 26 Cal. App. 3d 320, 102 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1972); In re State in

the Interest of G. C., 121 N.J. Super. 108, 296 A.2d 102 (Super. Ct. 1972); People v. Jackson,
65 Misc. 2d 909, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731 (1971), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 734, 284 N.E.2d 153, 333 N.Y.S.2d

167 (1972).
118. E.g., In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969).
119. E.g., State v. Stein, 203 Kan. 638, 456 P.2d 1 (1969); People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d
360, 229 N.E.2d 596, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967).
120. The courts often seem to go past considering that the school official has a right
based upon practical necessity to search lockers. In People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 229
N.E.2d 596, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967), the court held: "Not only have the school authorities a
right to inspect but this right becomes a duty when suspicion arises that something of an
illegal nature may be secreted there. When Dr. Panitz learned of the detectives' suspicion, he
was obligated to inspect the locker." Id. at 363, 229 N.E.2d at 598, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
121. These decisions rely upon the United States Supreme Court ruling in Burdeau v.
McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921), that the fourth amendment protects citizens from governmental action only and that, since school officials are not government officials their searches
are not prohibited by the Constitution. See, e.g., In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75
Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969).
122. See note 130 infra and accompanying text.
123. 20 N.Y.2d 360, 229 N.E.2d 596, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967).
124. 203 Kan. 638, 456 P.2d 1 (1969).
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tiveness of this approach in allowing school officials the authority required to
protect students' welfare. In those cases police officers were given permission
by school officials to search students' lockers in which contraband was discovered. Upholding the validity of the searches, the courts held that lockers
are for a student's exclusive possession vis-A-vis other students, not school
administrators who have custody and control over the lockers and inherent
12 5
power to inspect them.
While this ownership approach would obviate any need for determining
whether school authorities are government officials under the fourth amendment, one further precaution should be observed by the school authorities.
Conflicts with the assertion that students have a reasonable expectation of the
privacy of their lockers - should be avoided. Although the factual circumstances often render the reasonable expectation argument unconvincing27
school officials should specifically inform students that lockers will be searched
periodically. One method would be to require students to sign an acknowledgement, before lockers are assigned, stating that the student has been informed of the school authorities' intentions.
The ownership theory is clearly inapplicable with regard to the search of
the student's person. Consequently, whether the school official should be considered a government official under the fourth amendment is of paramount
importance." 2s The overwhelming precedent leads to the conclusion that he is
not; therefore, the school official may proceed to search students under the
halo of the in loco parentis doctrine.129 Such an approach overlooks the fact
that school authorities often act in concert with local police and are, in effect,
police agents. 30 This possibility requires an alternative approach to that
presently applied.
A balanced approach would be to consider the school authorities as govern125. Id. at 640, 456 P.2d at 3; People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 363, 229 N.E.2d 596,
598, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22, 25 (1967).
126. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), in which the Supreme Court suppressed evidence obtained by an electronic eavesdropping device installed outside a public
telephone booth. The Court held that "the Fourth Amendment protects people not places."
Id. at 351. This idea could be argued by students whose lockers are searched on the ground
that they reasonably expected their lockers to be private.
127. Usually the schools assign lockers, own the locks used on them, keep master keys,
and do in fact conduct regular searches, about which students have knowledge, for lost and
stolen books. Situations such as these should put students on notice and dissolve any reasonable expectations they might have.
128. See note 121 supra.
129. E.g., In re Fred C., 26 Cal. App. 3d 320, 102 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1972); In re State in
the Interest of G. C., 121 N.J. Super. 108, 296 A.2d 102 (Super. Ct. 1972); People v. Jackson,
65 Misc. 2d. 909, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731 (1971), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 734, 284 N.E.2d 153, 333 N.Y.S.2d
167 (1972); Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
130. In Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970), school officials solicited a
number of unidentified student informers to provide information as to who was selling or
possessed drugs. The school's dean had weekly meetings with local police in which lists
compiled by the dean of potential and suspected drug users were discussed. The dean also
conducted "shake downs" of groups of students in search of drugs when he thought it
necessary.
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ment officials, but to require only a showing of a reasonable suspicion by
them for the issuance of a search warrant. Existing cases holding school
authorities not to be government officials have held that a "reasonable suspicion"' 31 is all that is required to justify the search of a student's person. In
addition, the Supreme Court has shown that the requirements for issuing
1 32
By adopting
search warrants can vary with the circumstances of the case.
simple and
just,
yet
a
officials
school
present
would
Florida
an
approach
such
of the
danger
be
little
would
There
students.
their
protect
to
effective way
warrant requirement causing a delay that could frustrate the procedure. The
school official, although a government official, still would be in loco parentis
in these school matters and could have the student held in isolation under
surveillance while awaiting the warrant. Additionally, as in all warrant situations, the official would not need a warrant where a true emergency existed 3
or where a student voluntarily submitted to a search.
Therefore, differentiation between the search of a locker and of a student's
person would result in a balanced statutory guideline such as the following:
(5) County school boards of the State of Florida shall have no power to
allow, and neither school officials nor teachers shall conduct any unreasonable searches upon the persons of any students. Searches of students' persons
shall be deemed unreasonable unless an emergency situation exists, unless
the student gives a valid consent, or unless the search is conducted pursuant
to the issuance of a valid search warrant issued upon a showing by the
proper school authoritity that there is a reasonable suspicion that the
student to be searched is in possession of articles that endanger the health,
safety, or general welfare of the school population. However, no warrant
shall be required for the search by school officials of any property of which
the school board is legal owner, even though a use in such property may
have been granted to the students of the school in which the property is
located.

131.

E.g., In re Fred C., 26 Cal. App. 3d 320, 102 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1972); In re State in

the Interest of G. C., 121 N.J. Super. 108, 296 A.2d 102 (Super. Ct. 1972); People v. Jackson,
65 Misc. 2d 909, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731 (1971), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 734, 284 N.E.2d 133, 333 N.Y.S.2d

167 (1972).
132. The Supreme Court does not require probable cause for the issuance of every type
of warrant. In Camera v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the Supreme Court held a
person has a right to refuse entry into his residence when a housing inspector seeks to make
a warrantless inspection. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), extended Camera to
cover commercial property. More importantly, the two cases were further used by the
Court to set up guidelines for obtaining warrants for inspector's searches. Balancing the
public need for health and fire safety and private rights, the guideline set down was that a
search warrant may be issued for such administrative searches where there is a reasonable
basis for believing that an inspection should be made of a given area. The key for less
stringent requirements is that the primary purpose of the inspections is not to obtain
evidence for a criminal prosecution, but is to protect the health and safety of others.
133. An example might be a situation in which the student is reasonably expected to be
carrying a lethal weapon. See note 116 supra.
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CONCLUSION

The recent trend toward greater protection of students' constitutional
rights has only served to confuse further the already uncertain doctrine of
in loco parentis. Florida's public school students, teachers, and administrators
are in need of guidelines defining the limits of the school's authority over the
pupil. These guidelines should balance school officials' needs for authority
to properly regulate Florida's schools and students' constitutional rights.
Through enactment of legislation such as that proposed herein that balance
could be achieved.
W. RODERICK BOWDOIN
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